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1A few months ago whites in a certain neighbourhood in Salisbury, 
Rhodesia, were agitating against a few Asian people who had moved into 
their area. A few weeks ago, the laws regulating racial ownership of 
land were repealed allowing any black person to acquire property wherever 
he or she wishes. Such is the speed of change in Rhodesia.
What strikes one about Rhodesia is the fact that traditional 
social patterns persisted and were defended as if they were immutable, 
unchallengeable and inevitable rights up to the very threshold of sudden 
and sweeping readjustments. Literally the past few months in Rhodesia 
and South West Africa - Namibia have seen the partly visible but largely 
invisible emergence of completely different kinds of societies. Such 
is the tempo of events in Southern Africa today. Every other white- 
controlled society in our region has reached what for many seemed a 
remote political and social watershed within no more than a brief few 
years of quickening events. I do not know whether South Africa’s water­
shed lies in the nineteen-eighties or not. I do know, however, that we 
are moving irrevocably towards this watershed of social change. This 
makes my task today very difficult. By 198S, South Africa may be very 
much as it is today, or it could be , or on its way to being, a sig­
nificantly different kind of society, with new political faces, new 
policies and a different social fabric.
Scientists, even social scientists, are supposed to be 
cautious people who hesitate to generalise beyond the indications of 
available evidence, and whose claims should be subject to possible 
refutation if alternative evidence, argument or experience is produced. 
Hence, while 'futures research’ is gaining stature in social science, one 
is uneasy nevertheless about speculating about future trends in any kind 
of society. Prediction, as opposed to speculation, is legitimate but 
rare, since it requires knowledge of the trends in and salience of all 
the variables likely to produce a future social situation. This is 
clearly impossible when one does not even know the precise patterning 
of variables determining our present situation. Therefore I must in­
dicate in advance that the scenarios I am about to sketch are speculation. 
The most one might say of it is that it is informed guesswork.
An exercise like this, however, is not entirely disreputable. 
There is some value in extrapolating present social trends and indications
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and it lies in the fact that the picture which emerges highlights the 
implications of the present and allows one to reflect on what we, col­
lectively, might be in the process of reproducing and creating. Just 
as we must learn from the past we also should be enlightened by our 
possible or probable future.
South Africa, like Rhodesia, old Mozambique, and Namibia, 
is a society under mounting external pressure, indeed we may say under 
siege. The siege is made doubly stressful by the fact that an unknown 
proportion of people behind the battlements see the siege as a source 
of hope not fear. The siege, for some, is made even more difficult by 
the knowledge that some of the enemies at the battlements have a just 
cause.
For present purposes, however, the most important thing about 
the siege is that sentiments are strong, morale is exposed to attack, 
many interests, material or otherwise are at risk and the normally very 
reassuring or repressing edifice of tradition, precedent and taken-for- 
granted social reality has developed large and visible cracks. In 
other words, our society has begun to acquire what some superficial 
observers (predictors of imminent revolution) have long thought it 
always had, namely the preconditions for unexpected swings of behaviour 
and attitude, even for social disruption and disorder. This means two 
things; firstly that anything like precise forecasting is totally im­
possible, and secondly, that, now especially, it is very important to try 
to assess future developments.
I SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS
Speculating about the future on the basis of arbitrary, selective 
or impressionistic trends can be interesting; it can even contain the 
occasional gifted insight. I would prefer to proceed within some kind 
of guiding framework, best outlined by the following basic assumptions 
and propositions - some compatible with one another, others contra­
dictory.
1-1 Although heavily outnumbered, \^hites in South Africa have
3a sufficiently large absolute population size to retain considerable bar­
gaining power under virtually all conditions of change. Their bargaining 
power is enhanced by education and technological skills and ultimately 
resides in the fact that whites, by themselves, could severely disrupt, 
violently or otherwise, any system which would threaten their basic in­
terests. The situation here, therefore, is significantly different from 
those in Rhodesia and South West Africa or those in Mozambique and 
Angola before the Portuguese coup.
1-2 Western pressure on South Africa, all surface indications 
notwithstanding, is fundamentally aligned with the interests of South 
Africa's private enterprise economy in that it affords the West the 
justification for keeping other interested external powers at bay (e.g. 
Soviet Union) or discouraging an escalation of fundamentally antagonistic 
military influences (e.g. Cuba). Western strategies for change in 
South Africa are also ultimately constrained by majority public opinion 
in Western countries which is likely to be aroused from indifference by 
anything that began to look like a 'sellout' of whites. (It should be 
noted that popular racial attitudes in Europe are fairly similar to 
popular attitudes among South African whites, particularly English- 
speakers.(Deutsche Institut fur Internationale Pgdogo^ische Forschung/ 
Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, 1976))
1-3 Political change in South Africa is most likely to take 
a so-called 1consociational form' in the initial stages of power-sharing. 
Consociation is the name given to arrangements whereby the leadership of 
racially or culturally defined groups in a society shares decision-making 
in one form or another without there necessarily being a formal joint 
participation in politics at the grassroots. South African politics are 
racially organised, since whites, because of the colonial roots of modern 
South Africa, inherited their privileges collectively as members of ethnic 
groups. Interests, although deeply affected by class, are perceived in 
racial terms. When power is devolved in South Africa, it is most likely 
to occur by way of a process of joint negotiation between ethnic groups 
and subgroups leading to a period of formal ethnic representation on 
governing councils. Later on, when cross-cutting links and shared 
interests develop between blacks and whites a non-racial franchise could 
emerge.
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Furthermore, group representation means, in effect, a 
form of broad compromise between the two polar opposites of, on the one 
hand, a non-racial or integrated franchise, in which whites would be a 
small minority unable to ever exercise independent influence as a group, 
and, on the other hand, race separation involving some form of partition.
In present circumstances, a compromise path between these two opposites 
seems likely. At this stage whites will resist integration as too 
radical an alternative and partition, if it is to be in the least way 
equitable, will involve too large a sacrifice of resources and, indeed, 
military security.
Inter-race negotiation or joint ethnic decision-making as a 
form of political transition in South Africa is also indicated by the 
fact that the speed at which pressures for change are building up 
probably will leave insufficient time for an extension of the franchise 
on a mass popular basis as it has occurred in European and other 
Western democracies. The pace of internal political reform is so slow 
that at some stage or another it probably will be necessary to 'short 
cut* the process by bringing into being a committee or council (formally 
'consultative' in the early stages; perhaps) composed of representatives 
of the various ethnic groups as they currently are represented in the 
common area of South Africa.
Another reason for this prediction is that large, powerful and 
coherent party organisations which currently exist (the National Party, 
Inkatha, and perhaps even the (Coloured) Labour Party) are most likely to 
retain their identity and possibly even their positions of pre-eminence 
within their constituencies within an 'ethnic* governing coalition or 
consociation. Party interests are likely to be very powerful in dic­
tating the direction of change.
One possible variation on the scenario outlined would be an 
inter-party and simultaneously an inter-ethnic coalition, along the lines 
of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in Namibia, taking the country towards 
a non-racial franchise. However, this basically v/ould involve the same 
kind of inter-racial negotiation as the major scenario given above pre­
supposes ,
5Finally, it is important to note that popular political 
attitudes among black and white come closest to basic agreement on the 
issue of a 'consociational’ devolution of power, among all the alterna­
tives (Hanf et al, 1978).
1-4 South Africa’s social and political system - called the 
’apartheid society’ in the councils of the world - rests on multiple foun­
dations. These different foundations will shift, decay or crumble at 
different rates. The various basic processes which have produced 
apartheid are:
a) A conflict of nationalisms and accompanying power-interests 
within the same territory. Afrikaner and Zulu nationalism is overt, 
English-speaking South Africanism is a latent, unarticulated form of 
corporate identity with fairly open boundaries but with a much firmer 
centre than the boundaries would suggest. White society in South Africa 
is in many ways a coalition of two nationalisms; one dominant, the 
other accommodated but subdominant.
b) Material interests and privilege. The material interests 
of the white employer class have at times in our history depended on the 
super-exploitation and political subjugation of blacks but this is not a 
constant relationship. Under conditions of economic growth and expanding 
markets the employers interests cannot only accommodate but be served by 
black socio-economic and political development, provided that political 
stability is maintained. The popular material interests of rank-and-file 
whites, however, are much more directly in contradiction to the interests 
of blacks since these depend on privileged access to education and 
training, wage-bargaining power, land and public facilities. While an 
'expanding economic cake’ can accommodate the purely monetary interests 
of all races, benefits like residential land, space for and quality of 
public facilities, effective education and training and life-style 
opportunities generally do not expand in step with economic growth but 
are constrained by physical space and. population pressure, limitations 
of technology, lags in planning and bureaucratic inertia.
c) All the myriad and very common, universal social, psycho­
logical and cultural factors which cause inter-group tension, like 
prejudice towards outgroups, fear of strangers, parochialism, frustration 
and aggression deflected onto others, racial differences in lifestyles and 
verbal culture, etc. These lower-order factors acquire a particular
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power when they coincide with the interests shaped by nationalism, power 
and privilege.
Therefore, the form and nature of our society is not simply 
the result of any one single factor like prejudice, Afrikaner traditionalism 
or class interests. The structures of our divided society are massive.
Whereas in racially homogeneous societies equally pervasive structures of 
inequality may exist, there is an appearance of flexibility because 
•personnel’ changes readily occur. Working class children with good 
education can grow up to become staunch and accepted members of the 
middle class; people can adopt new lifestyles, acquire new religions, 
etc. The structures of social inequality, though powerful, are abstract 
in the sense that they are not socially visible. In South Africa, on the 
other hand, their forms coincide with race, people’s appearance and 
ethnic differences and these characteristics have come to be synonymous 
with nationalism, with status, etc. Hence, South African society has 
resisted and will continue to resist the gradualist, evolutionary pro­
cesses of change in terms of which individuals move upwards or change their 
social categories, which is so characteristic of homogeneous societies. Change 
in South Africa is much more likely than elsewhere to result from either 
violence, pressure or, as outlined in 1-3, an open acknowledgement of 
ethnic identity and the structures it symbolises, and a search for pro­
gressive alternatives within the framework of ethnic identity.
1-5 Inequality is South Africa’s greatest imperative for 
change, yet also the greatest single impediment to such change. Democracy 
and freedom is in a sense a luxury in the world, in substantial part made 
possible by the fact that in democracies different social groups, while 
perceiving their differences and competing interests, have an overriding 
sense of interdependence and of shared basic interests. Strong authority 
is not necessary because people at basis are willing to obey the rules of 
the social, economic and political ’game'. South Africa simply does not 
have sufficient guarantee of basic consensus to make a liberal democracy 
possible at this stage. As long as authority has to exist it will tend 
to operate differentially on different groups, and so increase basic dis­
agreement about the rules of the game. Therefore South Africa needs 
socio-economic reform as a preconditional for political evolution. Without 
rapid reform, South African society simply will not achieve the basic
7consensus to make a democracy work by the time that it is expected of 
South Africa.
1-6 Blacks in South Africa do not all have the same lot in 
life. Basic to many variations in circumstances there are two kinds of 
frustrations which different groups experience in different degrees - 
deprivations of material i^elfare on the one hand, and deprivations of 
dignity and status on the other. A working class black person with poor 
education feels the material pinch above that of lack of social esteem.
A black graduate, on the other hand, has a justifiable objective claim 
to dignity, worth and lifestyle opportunities, and he feels status 
deprivation most keenly. (Obviously both experience each other's dep­
rivations to a large degree.) Status deprivation is psychologically 
more painful than material deprivation (within limits) and people are 
sensitive to the most subtle nuances of deprivation. Therefore, the 
educational and social development of blacks will inexorably produce 
growing radicalism unless there is either full social acceptance of them 
by whites or clear-cut and complete separation. Since the latter is 
manifestly impossible, and the tempo of change in social conventions is 
slow, South Africa's greatest challenges to political stability lie 
ahead.
1-7 More broadly, our long period of relative stability and 
the patient acceptance by blacks of their lot has rested in large measure 
on what I have called elsewhere the 'perceived immutability' of the 
system (Schlemmer, 1976). White control and authority had acquired a 
thing-like quality of unchangeability. Recent events in Southern Africa, 
however, and necessary and inevitable reforns themselves have probably 
altered that perception. Previously our politics were the politics of 
depressed black political consciousness. Our future will be a future of 
rising black political consciousoness.
1-8 The black rank-and-file who have job-security and reasonable 
material prospects tend more than the middle-class elites to display 
political caution and a fear of any political instability which may 
undermine the economy and unleash the effects of latent ethnic divisions 
among blacks (Schlemmer (forthcoming), based on research conducted in. 
Soweto). This group is as yet largely unrepresented by political
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spokesmen. Provided a pattern of economic growth and community im­
provement can be sustained, the political mobilisation of this group 
will be at one and the same time a strong source of stability in a 
period of political change and an effective encouragement for further 
progressive change in South Africa since the articulated political 
aspirations of this group is likely to act as a powerful reassurance for 
whites.
1-9 The use of concepts like 'real change’ or 'cosmetic' 
change is generally superficial and lacks any reference to processes 
whereby change can occur. Existing patterns in South African society are 
maintained by myriad norms and conventions and it is possible that a 
period of relatively 'superficial* change (blacks in international hotels 
integrated sport) could so modify norms and perceptions on both sides 
that a threshold of social 'readiness' is reached beyond which, 'real* 
change is possible. On the other hand, an example of 'real' change 
introduced suddenly may cause a mobilisation of resistance which will 
in fact delay wider change on a longer-term basis. Obviously, it is 
also possible that 'cosmetic' changes may lull South African whites into 
thinking that a challenge is being met and so delay meaningful reform. 
Each issue has to be individually assessed.
1-10 Social change at the level of root conditions tends to 
be a slow process. While particular characteristics of racial status 
in a society which are directly governed by law, regulation or public 
expenditure can change fairly rapidly (like black representation on repre 
sentative councils, or numbers of blacks achieving a given level of 
education, for example), other patterns which are regulated by more 
complex processes change much more slowly. An example of this is to be 
found in the U.S.A. where despite the powerful civil rights movement 
and a generalised public commitment to racial equality, certain changes 
in the status of blacks are very gradual. Median family income for 
blacks in the U.S.A. was 54% of the white median family income in 1965 
and had risen to only 58% by 1973. In this period the absolute gap in 
median family income had widened from $4 700 to $5 330 in real terms. 
Between 1963 and 1973 the percentage of employed black men working at 
managerial and executive levels in the public and private sector rose 
from 3,5% to only 5,2%. (U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
9.
1973.) These examples are not intended as criticism of the U.S.A. but 
simply to illustrate how remarkably persistent certain _.nafterrrs?""are
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II A BROAD ASSESSMENT OF CHANGES SINfeE.,1970--....
South African society, like any other society, changes all the 
time. When one speaks of social change in a South African context, however, 
one tends not to be interested in the complexity of small shifts and 
readjustments which take place in daily life over time, one thinks of 
the broad patterns of race relations, economic behaviour and political 
policy which have tended to exhibit considerable basic persistence 
over numerous decades.
Longer range future change cannot be predicted on the basis of 
past change, but within a limited time-span immediate past changes might 
display a pattern which, to a less or greater degree, will hold for the 
immediate future. The period from. 1970 to 1980 ma3r, therefore be heln- 
ful in considering the likely changes which will take place from 1980 
to 1990. The assessment of the past decade will of necessity be cursory 
and superficial.
From 1970 onwards, black political activity appeared to recover 
from the 'lull of despondency' following Sharpeville and the destruction 
of the ANC and PAC movements in the early sixties. Mot only has formal 
political activity increased (e.g. Inkatha, the Black Consciousness Move­
ment in its formal manifestations like Black Peoples’ Congress, and the 
South African Indian Congress, etc.) but South Africa has seen the re­
emergence of underground political activity manifested in trials under 
the Terrorism Act and other laws.
Black labour activity and organisation (unregistered) has also 
re-emerged, in part stimulated by favourable job-market conditions un to 
1975/76. The strikes in 1972 and 1973, both in Natal and elsewhere 
attested to increasing worker restiveness.
This rash of labour activity coincided with a heightened
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wage-reform consciousness in the country as a whole from 1974 onwards; 
this being the era of the 'Poverty Datum Line' and the acceptance of 
more adequate minimym wage levels for blacks. The government responded 
to both the unofficial strikes and the unregistered labour activity by 
legislating for and encouraging a form of in-house bargaining (the Porks 
and Liaison Committee system, introduced earlier in the form of Works 
Committees but never encouraged) which was a slight improvement on 
earlier labour-relations practices for blacks which were almost entirely 
repressive. The Committee system, however, was not able to secure labour 
stability to the extent that had been anticipated. The government also 
banned a number of unregistered trade unionists. The outcome of this 
somewhat contradictory pattern has been the appointment of two commissions 
of enquiry (Wiehahn and Riekert) to usher in what is confidently expected 
to be a range of moderate but meaningful reforms in the sphere of official 
policies regarding black employment.
Another outcome is that black wages (not necessarily per 
capita black income) rose meaningfully and more rapidly than white wages 
over the period and at one stage just before the recent recession, even 
the absolute wage-gap between black and white wages narrowed marginally.
In view of trends in income inequality in other socieities this shift 
in the trend in wages in South Africa is not to be underrated. This 
t rend appears to have been slowed but not reversed by the 1976-9 
recession.
The movement of blacks into higher-level positions in 
industry and commerce appears to have been slow but steady (with the 
exception of more rapid advances for Indians) and quite recently has re­
ceived a boost from various codes of conduct for industry, the initial 
ones emanating from outside South Africa (Sullivan Principles, the 
British Parliamentary Enquiry and the EEC code). The broad pattern at 
the moment is that black graduates with suitable skills and a minimum of 
experience can find high-level employment in industry and commerce. Such 
employment at this stage, however, is still limited to specialised 
functions dealing with black labour or black consumers/customers. The 
movement of African and Coloured personnel into 'line' executive positions is 
currently blocked by convention and by the lack of suitable skills.
Blacks are, however, very slowly but steadily moving into lower-level line* 
supervision but here again the suitability of skills, both formal and
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informal is an impediment. Despite the economic recession, these recent 
developments highlight the desperate need for improved educational 
facilities for blacks.
At the constitutional level, the government has reacted to the 
effective breakdown of the very largely consultative functioning of the 
Coloured Persons Representative Council first by appointing a commission 
of enquiry (the Theron Commission), then by rejecting the far-reaching 
political reforms suggested by that commission, and more recently by 
proposing a new constitutional arrangement to encompass white, Coloured 
and Indian politics - a system of parallel legislatures and limited 
possibilities for joint decision-making. When these proposals were 
widely rejected by influential Coloured representatives, the government 
departed from traditional one-sided decision-making and entered into a 
process of discussion and negotiation with Coloured leaders which is still 
continuing. While the outcome is uncertain, these events have revealed 
one aspect of the change-potential which inheres in at least some of the 
ineffective political structures created by the government for blacks; 
this being that when these arrangements fail by virtue of their inef­
fectiveness, the government, in order to retain credibility for its 
policies, has to attempt to replace them by arrangements less likely to 
fail, and hence probably more effective as reforms.
One of the reasons for the delay in introducing new constitutional 
arrangements for Coloureds and Indians is the insistence cf representatives 
of the latter groups that Africans should be included in the arrangements. 
This has added a new thrust to the challenge to government policy represented 
by the question of non-Homeland urban Africans.
This challenge, however, was manifested in most dramatic and 
concrete terms by the African and Coloured urban disturbances which 
occurred from October of 1976 until mid-1977, claiming many hundreds of 
young African lives. Essentially disturbances among youth and young 
unemployed adults, these were demonstrations which nevertheless appeared 
to have the support and blessing of nearly six out of ten urban residents 
(Hanf et al, 1978: 335-336). These disturbances also revealed a surprising 
degree of shared consciousness across the African-Coloured racial barrier. 
Caused in an immediate sense by educational grievances the disturbances
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soon revealed themselves to have much deeper political roots. In this 
author's view the causes included a sudden growth in unemployment after a 
period of rapid expansion of opportunity up to 1975, insecurities in regard 
to citizenship and future residence in the run up to Transkei independence, 
a factor which deeply affected one of the most politically conscious of 
all African groups, the Xhosa-speaking group, the pervasive conscientising 
effect of black consciousness thinking among young blacks and the rise in 
political expectations following on the rapid series of changes in 
Southern Africa since 1974.
The urban disturbances have brought a response from the 
private sector in the form of the establishment of the Urban Foundation, 
an organisation dedicated to improving the quality of life in the cities, 
but there has also been some melting of the government’s formerly firm 
ideological stance which would have it that urban Africans are to have 
no status and rights other than those of Homeland citizens ’temporarily’ 
absent from their own territories. Concessions on the part of the 
government have recently included the granting of 99 year leashold rights 
to urban Africans with rights to inheritance (an assurance was recently 
given that children who were Homeland citizens would be able to enjoy 
normal urban security of tenure), increased funding for African education 
in urban areas and support for urban upliftment schemes in Soweto, the 
major urban black complex. There have also been accumulating verbal 
indications of a softening of the government’s earlier resistance to 
regarding the urban Africans as a group whose civic and constitutional 
future is inescapably p>art of the common domain of South African politics 
and not of that of the Homelands.
The Homeland policy has continued to deliver its own contra­
dictions within South African politics. While the independence (political 
but not economic) of the Transkei and Bophuthatswana has revealed a 
strong tendency among Homeland-based elites to maximise short-term 
political advantages, the numerically most powerful group, the Zulus, 
under the leadership of Chief Gatsha Butbelezi, has accepted Homeland 
autonomy but clings with determination to its political stake in the 
common society by rejecting ultimate independence. To boot, this convic­
tion as well as other political and developmental goals are now formally 
pursued by the largest black political organisation in South Africa’s
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history, Inkatha. This organisation, protected by its semi-formal status 
within the Homeland political system and its firm rejection of violence 
and confrontation, holds out the possible prospect of a consolidation of 
massive economic bargaining power if its growth and organisation prosper 
in the future.
A massive setback to South Africa’s attempts to cultivate 
external support has been a series of deaths of blacks while in 
detention for alleged or suspected political offences. In particular, 
the death of the well-known black consciousness leader, Steve Biko, 
caused large international repercussions. The political costs of what 
so many regard as naked police brutality have become painfully obvious 
over the decade and, tentatively, one senses a much more cautious approach 
in very recent times. More broadly, the leading generals in the defence 
force have been actively propagating a ’hearts and minds' policy of 
winning black loyalty to the South African government’s cause. Recent 
moves to improve the conditions of urban blacks, to alleviate the 
Coloured housing shortage in a crash programme and other departures 
reflect a slow but steady change in the mode of securing order in South 
African society. Statements by various Cabinet Ministers reveal a 
growing awareness of the political utility of securing compliance 
through the satisfaction rather than repression of aspirations. The 
government's often stated awareness of the political risks and costs of 
unemployment is another example of a new approach . A belated policy of 
strategic reform appears to be gradually emerging to complement harsh 
political security measures.
As one would expect in the changing climate of South Africa, 
and in the light of the lessons of Rhodesia and South West Africa, 
white racial and political attitudes are changing. The trend is for a 
slow but meaningful liberalisation of racial attitudes as an overall 
trend. This broad movement is not even across all areas of race relations, 
however, and certain issues reflect hard interest in the maintenance of 
traditional patterns, like, for example, the Group Areas Act, which 
provides for separate residential areas for different races. The 
resistance to residential integration illustrates the powerful effect 
of a combination of material interests (inter alia property values) and 
the desire to protect the private social sphere from ’invasion’ by 
people perceived to have different lifestyles and modes of community
interaction. Although the prospect of black control of political affairs 
is firmly rejected by whites, other reforms in the political and ’public* 
sphere are receiving increasing support, like the possibility of a 
degree of power sharing, integration of public facilities, and increased 
economic and occupational opportunity for blacks (Schlemmer, 1978).
This changing climate of attitudes has recently been accompanied 
by the first signs of actual changes in behaviour which extend beyond the 
formally sanctioned confines of racial mixing' in ’international' hotels 
and integrated sport. One notices more and more black neople in 
certain ’white* nightclubs, black people now dare risk having meals 
in some 'white' restaurants and lunch-bar facilities , a few Coloured 
people informally rent flats in the more anonymous white apartment house 
areas in Johannesburg, Coloured and Indian supervisors and foremen now 
can have whites working under their control in some sectors of employment, 
and, more formally, for example, some black children attend white 
private schools, more and more park facilities are integrated and black 
traffic inspectors are exercising authority over all motorists, etc.
In contrast to these trends, there may be signs of a determined 
'backlash' reaction from groups of whites of unknown size. One notices, 
for example, private campaigns to rid white apartment house areas of 
Coloured tenants, a newspaper summary of the survey results upon which 
the picture of attitude trends given above was based elicited numerous 
truculent late-night phone calls to the author and very recently the 
white Mineworkers* Union called an illegal strike in protest against the 
softening of 'job-reservation'. The indications are that a polarisation 
of attitudes and reactions to race is taking place among whites, but a 
somewhat elliptical polarisation with the majority group undergoing a 
slow but steady liberalisation of attitudes. These proportions may be 
reversed, however, in the membership of the National Party and its caucus - 
there is clear evidence that even government-supporting white voters are 
more liberal than their public representatives, on average (Schlemmer,
1978, Hanf et al, 1978).
Lastly, in this overview, some mention must be made of the 
so-called 'Information Department scandal'. The details, however juicy, 
need not detain us here. Suffice it to say that the net effect of the
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whole affair has probably been to create widespread impressions of financial 
corruption among certain senior officials, impressions of government 
complicity in the use of public funds and resources to promote party 
political interests, signs of dangerous adventurism in South Africa’s 
international relations and impressions of high-level attempts to cover 
up the true facts. Whatever the outcome, this episode has hastened a 
process in which National Party politics has become increasingly 
distinguishable from Calvinist moral rectitude, and it has also severely 
weakened the web of nationalist Afrikaner unity - virtually all the 
'heroes' and 'villains’ of the piece, the executioners and the scape­
goats have been members of the corporate power-elite. The National Party's 
formerly central location in Afrikaans religious culture and 
'folk unity' is shifting noticeably.
These, very briefly and oversimply stated, appear to be the 
trends that will take South Africa into the decade of the eighties.
With the earlier propositions and these trends as guidance, a specu­
lative picture of South African society in 1989 will now be sketched.
Ill SOUTH AFRICA '1989'
The following 'predictions' are based on the assumption that 
there will not be a change of government by the end of the 1980's. At 
most there will be a realignment of factions within the National Party 
government (see later). The speculation is deliberately concrete.
Wealth and Lifestyle
White South Africans will be less-affluent, on average than 
they are now; inflation and fuel costs having steadily outstripped increases 
in wages and salaries. Economic growth over the eighties is likely to 
have been lower than the minimum necessary to help maintain formerly high 
levels of affluence. The economy will, however, probably be sound, having 
withstood a succession of crises of confidence and shortages of invest­
ment capital, helped by government investment in arms production. It will 
also have achieved well-nigh universal localisation of production and 
import replacement, part of a policy aimed at withstanding international 
pressures. A new local industry of high prestige will probably be the
16.
computer and cybernetics industry.
Lifestyle in general also will be relatively constrained by 
growing shortages of space for recreation and housing. New developments 
in South African cities will be of a medium density type and the re­
development and upgrading of areas closer to city-centres will be wide- 
s pread . This will make possible sophisticated forms of electrical 
public transport and Johannesburg will have a developing underground 
transportation system. Life for the white urban dweller will much more 
closely resemble that in the more crowded European cities than is the 
case at present. This change in lifestyle will be somewhat 'softened* 
by the fact that black domestic service, although it will be much more 
expensive, will continue because of a persisting shortage of jobs for 
less-skilled blacks (see later).
Personal Freedoms and Civil Liberties
It was mentioned in the beginning of this discussion that South 
Africa is becoming a 'siege* society. The pressures will develop in the 
eighties (see later). These pressures and threats to state (or government) 
security will have been used as justification for even more security 
legislation than we have at present, including severe curbs on freedom 
of the press. The rule of law and the right to legal redress will have 
been even further undermined. It needs to be noted that the restriction 
of freedoms associated with democratic society will be accompanied, by 
fairly significant race reforms. Indeed, the more reform the greater 
will be the perceived need for a tightening of internal security.
By the end of the eighties, some of the Afrikaans press under 
pressure from journalists, will have joined the English-language press 
in fairly vehement opposition to curbs on press freedom - an opposition 
severely constrained by the very restrictions it would oppose. Certain 
newspapers, however, will act as automatic legitimators of government 
policy.
For most white South Africans the restrictions of the freedoms 
associated with security affairs and communications will mean little in 
direct ways. They will have become subject to far-reaching indirect 
effects, however. The ready justification for all manner of restrictive
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laws and regulations will have "infected other areas of public life. A 
trend discernable in the sixties and seventies will have hardened into a 
firm style of administration . This style will rest on the assumption 
by public authorities that all areas of public, semi-public and even 
private life can be regulated within a bureaucratic framework, aimed 
at achieving consistency, a lack of troublesome (for the administrator) 
’untidiness’ in public behaviour and a compliant, regulated public.
Each successive small inroad into personal liberty will undermine the 
morale characteristic of populations in an open democracy and make further 
inroads easier to achieve. South Africa will have come to resemble an 
East European society of the fifties and sixties and few will complain, 
more will simply emigrate. White South Africans will have paid a heavy 
and unwitting price for the protection of their identities and privilege. 
Fishermen will be regulated and licenced, dogs controlled, gardens and 
sidewalks kept under surveillance for ’nuisance’, traffic fines will be 
exorbitant, a 'braai on the beach' will make one liable to arrest, 
uniforms will have massive connotations of authority, occupations and 
professions will be regulated, etc., etc. All this will be achieved no 
longer so much in the name of morality but efficiency and regularity, 
while a dispirited population will become less and less efficient. The 
insecure lower-middle classes will love it, the talented individualists 
will scale their symbolic Berlin wall and leave.
Society always tends to generalise specific norms and standards 
if they are very salient. Pale and non-political forms of the Suppression 
of Communism Act and the Terrorism Act will creep into the neighbourhood, 
the campsite, the garden , the school and the office building. In the 
Cape it is already an offence to light a cámpfire on a beach; the damage 
has been done.
Values
Inflation and a relatively slow economic growth will have 
made the population more and more narrowly materialistic and, quite 
frankly, 'mean'. The steady breakdown of the extended family and kin 
networks among Africans and Indians will mean that the 'nuclear' or 
conjugal family will have become the focus of interests for virtually 
everyone. The grand traditions of Afrikaner hospitality and generosity 
and African communal sharing will be becoming distant cultural memories.
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On a more positive note, the Afrikaans churches by 1989 will 
be relatively smaller and less influential.and they will have rediscovered 
their distant Calvinist heritage which embraces a deep responsibility 
and concern for the worldly condition in all its aspects. A unity of 
major Christian churches in regard to major social and political issues 
will be possible.
The values underpinning government will have been profoundly 
affected by 'Muldergate* (the Information scandal). As already indicated, 
Muldergate will have hastened a process of 'secularisation1 of Afrikaans 
politics. Instead of the double standards and lip-service to Christian- 
National traditionalism of the sixties and seventies, the informing basic 
values will be those of statism - strong and pervasive government for 
its own sake.
In a 'managed' society, and one short of investment capital, 
private enterprise will find itself drawn ever closer to the administration, 
and the administration to big business. The trade-off will be mutually 
beneficial. Many irksome, traditionally-based restrictions on employer 
freedoms will have vanished because the administration will have 
'modernised' its controls; race will be less important as a factor in 
labour regulations and policy. The losers will be the small competitors, 
and along with their demise will come South Africa's heyday of planning.
The ebb and flow of the rhetoric of planning - town, regional, development, 
educational, manpower and all other sorts of planning - will in part 
replace the mechanisms of the market and of supply and demand. (It will 
also be the heyday of bad sociologists, unless sociology will have been 
squeezed into obscurity by 'Institutes' of Social Workers, Planners, 
Psychologists, Personnel Managers and Administrators.) South Africa will 
be a magnificent version of a post capitalist cum state capitalist society 
but one with planning and regulation writ very large because of the 
tensions of survival.
Government and Constitution
The government's constitutional proposals of the late seventies 
will have flowered into a complex consociational arrangement involving 
separate legislative chambers for whites, Coloureds, Indians (or 
Coloureds and Indians together), certain urban Africans, linked together
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by a painfully cumbersome joint cabinet or executive council (names are 
arbitrary) with white Cabinet Ministers enjoying at least a parity 
of numbers, as well as a veto or blocking right. This executive will 
in turn be linked via another federal structure to certain non­
independent and enlarged Homelands - KwaZulu, Gazankulu, Qua Qua, the 
Swazi and Ndebele territories and possibly Lebowa. A 'supreme council’ 
or body of a similar description with a white Executive President and 
one or two African Executive Vice Presidents will be the highest tier of 
government, projecting great prestige to the outside world but controlled 
pretty effectively by the white power segment in the lower-level executive, 
council.
Gradually, during the nineties, the interests of the ethnic 
leadership factions will draw closer together, and make a shift towards 
non-racialism possible, especially when major political parties are 
ready to go into coalition across race lines. In the late eighties, how­
ever, this will be prevented by as yet unresolved racial conflicts, 
particularly the group areas problem. (See below.) In the 1980's 
the system will be what Hanf et al (1978) have termed ’sham con- 
sociationalism’ although it will hold more promise than the name 
suggests.
The National Party would have undergone quite considerable re­
grouping as a result of breakaway movements by the late nineteen eighties. 
Quite probably it will include bits and pieces of the present conservative 
opposition factions and will have lost a more 'verligte'^ segment, but 
not a large one. A Progressive Federal Party cum verligte Nationalist 
opposition will be significantly larger than today.
This prediction depends, however, on the ’centre* faction
2)of the party at the moment - shall we say the P.W. Botha support group 
retaining a large share of control. If the Transvaal right-wing group 
gains the ascendancy there will be a much larger opposition containing 
one or two present Cabinet Ministers which could gain a victory at the 
polls. If it does the process outlined will be modified to involve 
much more decentralisation of government and a quicker political 
evolution. If it does not, the process predicted above will take five 
to ten years longer to emerge.
1) ’verligte’ = enlightened - the National Party ’left wing'
2) The present Prime Minister
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Among blacks there will be a major struggle for ascendancy at 
various levels of government between a fairly coherent Zulu-centred 
political grouping (an extension, perhaps, of Inkatha) and an amalgam of 
other African groupings. Coloured and Indian parties will vacillate 
hugely in the early eighties but gradually align themselves with whites 
as the possibilities of effective power-sharing emerge. Conflict 
between factions on the white/Coloured/Indian side on the one hand and 
the African side on the other will prevent race polarisation between 
white and African becoming a severe threat to internal stability. .
Threats to the System
During the eighties the disaffected 'radical' group among 
blacks drawn from those many people fervently committed to a common 
society and unitary franchise, will grow and either be suppressed by 
security controls or will flee the country. The vocal expatriate group 
abroad will become steadily augmented, and its ranks will be swelled by 
younger, chronically unemployed urban Africans. This external group will 
be the emergent South African system's greatest source of woe. Their 
political idealism will be sympathetically received and their grievances 
will elicit concrete support from many quarters. By the late eighties they 
would have established a South African expatriate army if they could 
find a fully adequate base territory. This will be problematic for 
them in view of South Africa's economic strength and capacity to sanction 
an independent Zimbabwe, Botswana or Mozambique prepared to assist 
expatriate groups actively. They will, however, be given more or less token 
recognition by one or more of these territories and will probably 
establish limited base facilities during the eighties sufficient only for 
mounting small-scale insurgency ventures. This insurgency will un­
doubtedly be mounted with very sophisticated technical equipment and 
back-up by the late eighties and will constitute a threat of high symbolic 
magnitude even though it will probably lack the capacity to threaten the 
system. The symbolic threat will be heightened by considerable inter­
national support in a world which will find it difficult to understand 
South Africa's curious way of devolving power. Symbolic sanctions of 
various kinds will accompany the insurgency, and the occasional urban 
bomb blast or act of sabotage will maintain a view of South Africa as an 
economic risk. Because South Africa will be relatively rich in a Third 
World still struggling to develop, third world hostility will be sharply
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focussed on South Africa, even after black faces appear in the ’executive* 
or ’supreme* governing councils. Hostility to South Africa will have 
assumed a ritualised form viith its ovm brand of self-perpetuating 
rhetoric and analysis. Tensions between the West and the Third World 
will make it necessary for the West to pay heed to the various externally 
based anti South African campaigns. This will be the nature of the siege 
on South Africa.
The greatest threat to stability in South Africa will be in 
the urhan areas and among black youth. The unemployed, which will be 
substantial in number in the eighties, will have real grievances but as 
in 1976/7 working adults will support them and prevent the onset of 
total despair. Other young blacks will be affected by the myriad subtle 
tensions and anxieties brought about by change and rising expectations.
The challenge throughout the eighties will be the question of how to 
cope x-jith the instabilities which follow change. Youth disturbances 
will occur again and perhaps again.
Labour unrest will occur from time to time but will be limited 
in scope by the fear of unemployment and will gradually come under the 
control of black political movements like Inkatha. If the pace of 
change were to slow doxm too much or stall, then the society might see 
a trial of strength in the form of mass short-term strikes organised fairly 
coherently.
During the late eighties the system could survive these various 
threats only if the process of maintaining control and order is made 
legitimate by having black people sharing control of the system to a sub­
stantial degree. It seems reasonable to predict that this will be so by 
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Race Relations
At a lower level, social interaction between the races will 
have changed markedly in some ways but not in others. An extension of 
the principle of ’international’ hotels will have occurred dn:that there 
will be ’international* or non-racial zones in cities, in which com­
pletely open facilities will exist. This x\'ill spread to the entire city 
centre in our major metropolitan complexes by the end of the decade. This
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will have taken some of the heat out of the system in that blacks will 
feel that they can identify with the full fruits of development. The 
heated debate in society will concern segregated residential areas. One 
might anticipate that there will emerge ’white* areas with some blacks 
given concessions to live in them, ’ethnic’ areas and open areas; initially 
very limited but expanding. The feeling will be concentrated on the 
’white’ areas, however, and the end of the decade will probably not see 
this issue fully resolved.
This crisis in race relations will be accompanied by a parallel 
debate on the ’Immorality Act' and the Fixed Marriages Act. Because of 
their essentially private symbolism, these acts will outlast effective 
application and during the eighties, convictions under the immorality 
act will dwindle away. The Mixed Marriages Act will then create 
enormous problems and there will be a pathetic small group of 'informal' 
families. This debate will be South Africa’s greatest absurdity for 
the eighties and a test of the wisdom of the society will be whether or 
not these laws are repealed before the end of the decade.
As said before, these ’predictions' are simply informed guesses, 
and I would be the last person to guarantee their validity. Possibly the 
most penetrating questions which can be asked about them will concern the 
time-scale. Black people who, understandably, are impatient for change 
are likely to feel that the time-scale for change is ridiculously 
extended. Others basically content with the situation will be lulled 
by the surface normality of everyday events and feel that the time-scale 
has been needlessly foreshortened. Similarly a longer-term historical 
view of the situation might suggest that change will come more slowly 
than suggested. At this stage, obviously, I would stand by my suggested 
t ime-scale.
The ’predictions1 offered suggest that South Africa will 
survive as a reasonably ordered, viable and coherent system offering at 
least basic security to all but the very poor and unemployed on the 
fringes of the system. Unemployment, particularly among energetic youth, 
is one of the most serious threats to the system. In the absence of 
foresight, courageous leadership in positions of power and policies 
which are tested against benchmarks of effectiveness in dealing with the
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root causes of problems, however, South Africa's survival will be 
accompanied by at least a decade of anguish and much political and 
administrative absurdity. Neither whites nor anyone else will be 
'swamped' or driven into the sea but during the eighties many people's 
morale and pride might well be under severe duress.
South Africa's probable future does not indicate the need for 
extremes or drastic measures of any variety, whether from whites or 
blacks. It does, however, indicate a need for sincere concern about the 
quality of our collective survival.
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